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I.

INTRODUCTION

The East Asian countries were hit hard by the financial crisis of 1997 but experienced a
significant and remarkable recovery due in part to far-reaching economic and regulatory reforms.
However, a decade later, the Asian countries are suffering again from the ongoing global
economic crisis which began in the summer of 2007. If this current crisis is not managed
effectively, the Asian economic situation could escalate into a more serious crisis than that of
1997-98. Due to the increased globalization of financial markets, crises tend to become more
severe and contagious even if the affected countries have strong macroeconomic fundamentals.
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The two crises, ten years apart, provide us with a unique case study to examine whether or not
the recovery from the 1997 crisis and the extensive reform efforts during the post-crisis period in
Asia have been well executed, or whether they have been incomplete and ineffective in
addressing the on-going global economic and financial crises since 2007.
Focusing on the Korean economy, which experienced the worst damage as well as the
most successful recovery from the 1997 crisis, this paper discusses the successes and failures of
the post-crisis reform efforts and identifies vulnerable areas that need further reform in Korea.
There is no precise answer for why and how one of the most successful developing economies
over the past 40 years suddenly became a victim of the Asian financial/economic crisis.
Although policy makers and academics still discuss the true causes and nature of the 1997 Asian
crisis, the case of Korea, in particular, has certainly highlighted the potential dangers from the
volatility of certain types of financial flows, the importance of an efficient financial system and
effective corporate governance, and the additional dangers of moral hazard and global
contagion.2 Korea has experienced one of the fastest recoveries among the crisis-hit Asian
countries by conducting efficient crisis management policies, financial market restructuring, and
institutional reforms.3
This paper also discusses some of the specific lessons that can be learned from Korea’s
experience during the 1997 Asian financial crisis in order to help prevent from the reoccurrence
of similar financial crises and economic downturns in the future. They are: 1) monitoring
international capital flows and conducting better international debt management; 2) maintaining
a competitive, efficient and well-regulated financial system to be protected from international
2

See Figure 1. For general references for causes, contagion, theories and policy responses on the Asian
financial crisis, see Pierre-Richard Agenor et al., eds., T HE ASIAN F INANCIAL CRISIS: C AUSES, C ONTAGION AND
CONSEQUENCES, Cambridge Univ. Press (1999).
3
See Figure 1, infra.
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contagia; 3) establishing an effective nonperforming asset management mechanism, such as the
Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO); and 4) enhancing regional financial
cooperation among the East Asian countries, such as a renewed Chiang Mai Initiative to provide
a short-term liquidity support, defend Asian currencies from speculative attack, and assist longterm economic growth in the East Asian region.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the unique nature of the 1997
crisis in Korea. Section III identifies the mistakes of Korean policy makers and businesses and
provides a basis for deriving lessons from the Korean experience. Section IV introduces the
successful and efficient reform measures and crisis management strategies while providing a
useful bench-marking case for non-Korean policy makers.

Section V identifies areas of

vulnerability in Korea to address during the on-going 2008-09 global economic crisis. Section
VI discusses regional economic integration and new Chiang Mai initiatives for the post-crisis
period in East Asia as important institutional reforms to prevent future financial crises in the
region. Section VII lists the policy lessons and concludes the paper.

II.

THE KOREAN CRISIS: UNIQUE AND DIFFERENT

On December 4, 1997, the Korean government reached a $58.4 billion standby agreement
with the IMF.4 In return, the emergency rescue plan required Korea to launch a range of
structural reforms in the financial sector, corporate sector, and labor market along with sound
management of macroeconomic policy to regain global market confidence. Until then, the

4

For a summary of the agreement, see Republic of Korea IMF Stand-by Arrangement December 5, 1997,
INT’L MONETARY FUND, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/oth/korea.htm. The $58.4 billion standby loan
package, about 13 percent of Korea’s GDP in 1997, was contributed by the IMF ($21.2 billion), World Bank and
Asian Development Bank ($14.2 billion), and the donor governments of the U.S., Japan and Europe ($23.1 billion).
See Jahyeong Koo and Sherry L. Kaiser, Recovery from a Financial Crisis: The Case of Korea, ECON. & FIN. REV.,
4th Q. 2001, at 24, 26 (detailing the loans made to Korea).
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Korean economy had recorded a remarkable performance during its relatively short modern
economic history, and became an exemplary case of economic development by applying the
export-led economic development strategy.

Korea's currency crisis in late 1997, however,

quickly escalated into financial and economic crises, with the continued loss of confidence by
foreign investors. With the exodus of foreign capital, the value of the Korean currency, the
Korean won, fell by more than 50 percent and real gross domestic product (GDP) contracted
about 6 percent during 1998.5 The downturn was led by a sharp contraction in corporate
investment and consumer spending.

A surge in corporate bankruptcies increased the

unemployment rate to over 8 percent by the end of 1998 from less than 3 percent in 1997.6
Although this development seems to be one of the typical stories of the so-called 1997 Asian
financial crisis, the Korean crisis is considered to have several unique aspects that differentiate
Korea from other crisis-hit Asian countries — in the causes of the crisis, crisis management
policies and strategies, and recovery processes.
First, the Korean crisis, in contrast to other crisis-hit countries in Asia, is believed to be
more of a liquidity crisis rather than a structural crisis.7 A relatively quick and impressive

5

Koo and Kaiser, supra note 4, at 27.
Id. at 30-31.
7
There have been two conflicting views for the root causes of the 1997 Asian crisis — the structural crisis
and the liquidity crisis. The former view states that the crisis was caused by weak macroeconomic fundamentals
and/or structural flaws in the socio-economic system; whereas the latter view believes that the Asian crisis was
caused mainly by the mismanagement of borrowed funds from abroad, foreign debt and international reserve assets.
For the recovery, a structural crisis would require major structural and institutional reforms which suggest a longterm recovery process, while a liquidity crisis would only need the rescheduling of debt, international cooperation of
lenders in debt restructuring, and the correction of currency and maturity mismatches between foreign financing and
domestic lending, along with short-term liquidity injection. The former view is in line with the so-called firstgeneration model of economic crisis a la Krugman. See Paul Krugman, A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises, 11
J. OF M ONEY, CREDIT, AND B ANKING 311 (1979). This view has been supported by the IMF’s economists. See,
e.g., Michael Dooley, A Model of Crises in Emerging Markets, International Finance Discussion Paper, No. 630, Bd.
of Gov. of the Fed. Res. System (1998). The latter view is consistent with the second-generation model of the selffulfilling prophecy of crisis. See, e.g., Steven Radelet and Jeremy Sachs, The Onset of the East Asian Financial
Crisis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper, No. 6680, 1998), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6680.pdf. Radelet and Sachs examined the weak-fundamental view and the financialpanic view as causes of the Asian crisis, and arrived at mixed conclusions.
6
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recovery process in Korea (the so-called V-shape recovery), strong fundamental macroeconomic
indicators prior to the crisis, and early repayment of borrowing from the IMF rescue package
provide supporting evidence for this view. This liquidity crisis argument does not mean that
Korea did not have structural weaknesses that needed to be corrected during the crisis. However,
the fundamental nature of the Korean crisis seems to have often been misrepresented or
exaggerated, for example, by those who allege that the crisis was caused by “crony capitalism”
or the complete failure of “the Asian model or Korean model” of economic development.8 The
Korean crisis was partly caused by internal problems, which will be discussed in Section III,
although contagia from the troubled Southeast Asian economies aggravated the Korean situation
with unfortunate ill-timing.
Second, the role of the government has been unique in Korea. During most of its four
decades of economic development, the government controlled the allocation and prioritization of
resources and credit.9 The government also determined restructuring initiatives and took full
control of reform agenda to correct its own mistakes and oversights during the post-crisis period.
From the neoclassical viewpoint, the role of the government in Korea would be considered to be
unfair and controversial. In reality, the interventionist role of the government is considered to be
one of the significant contributing factors for the so-called Asian miracle as well as the
remarkable recovery from the 1997 crisis.
Third, Korea has a culture of uniqueness and a long history of more than 4,300 years. A
deep understanding of culture is essential for an accurate appreciation of economic and social
8

One example of the reports asserting ‘crony capitalism’ and serious limitations of the ‘Asian model’ as
the main cause of the Asian crises is The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998: Adopting U.S. Intelligence and
Policy-Making to the Challenges of Global Economics (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown Univ.,
Working Group Rep. No. V, 2006).
9
See generally THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (Masahiko Aoki et al., eds., 2d ed. 2005) (1996) (comparing the history of government
intervention in economic growth and development in the East Asian nations).

108

EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5: 103

changes, including crisis and reform. Some examples of unique culture-rooted institutional
factors in Korea include chaebols (family-owned conglomerates), curb corporate bond markets
(informal and high interest private loans), unique management-employee relationships and labor
unions, compensation systems, the chaebol firms’ and suppliers’ relationship with the
promissory note market, localism, and the importance of blood and alumni relationships.
Examples of unique Korean features in its crisis management tools emerged during the postcrisis period – including a gold-collection campaign, self-imposed salary reductions by
employees, and the tripartite agreement for burden sharing among management, labor and
government.10
Fourth, IMF conditionality imposed an array of reforms in the financial sector, corporate
sector, labor market, and macroeconomic policy implementations.11 The IMF’s “one-size-fitsall” prescription for bailing out Korea has received criticisms and complaints from both within
and outside Korea. For example, some critics claim that the dictated banking reform plan was
too harsh and the tight monetary policy, which had the intention of attracting foreign capital,
resulted in a painful recovery process only after afflicting severe and unjustifiable damage to the
most vulnerable classes of society — such as low-income households, small-and-medium size

10

In February 1998, the Korean government, businesses and workers reached the Tripartite Agreement to
facilitate the labor market adjustment in Korea. See History of the Econ. and Soc. Dev. Comm’n. of Korea,
http://www.lmg.go.kr/eng/about/about04.asp (last visited March 15, 2010).
A historically unprecedented
organization, the Korea Tripartite Commission (KTC, since renamed the Economic and Social Development
Commission), issued “The Tripartite Joint Statement on Fair Burden Sharing in the Process of Overcoming
Economic Crisis,” and agreed that the labor union accepts the employer’s right to make redundancy layoffs, and, in
return, employers accepted the worker’s right to union representation, unemployment insurance and an extended
social safety net. See Keun Lee & Chung H. Lee, The Miracle to Crisis and the Mirage of the Postcrisis Reform in
Korea: Assessment After Ten Years, 19 J. OF ASIAN ECON. 425, 429 (2008). The KTC has provided a forum for
frank consultation, dialogue, and compromise among labor, management and government as an important reform
effort during the post-crisis period in Korea.
11
See International Monetary Fund, supra note 4.
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firms, and near-retirement age workers.12 The case of the Korean crisis and subsequent reforms
is considered to provide more convincing evidence, than other crisis-hit Asian countries, of the
ill-prepared, mechanical and culturally insensitive nature of the IMF rescue plan.13

III.

KOREA’S MISTAKES — ITS OWN LESSONS

A decade later, some consensus has been reached on Korea’s mistakes and oversights
before the 1997 crisis was erupted.

As Table 1 depicts, the Korean economy had strong

fundamentals as evidenced by relatively good-standing macroeconomic indicators prior to the
crisis. During the early and mid-1990s, Korea performed well with 5-9 percent real GDP growth
rates, 35-40 percent high saving and investment rates, 4-6 percent of inflation rate, 2 percent
unemployment, and prudent fiscal policy with a balanced government budget.
However, weakness and vulnerability had been developing during the early period of
economic development until the crisis broke out in several areas — the financial sector, the
corporate sector, Chaebol-government risk relations, and capital account and international debt
management. The danger of the microeconomic mismanagement in these vulnerable sectors and
institutional loopholes became more evident during the pre-crisis period in Korea, and these
areas turned out to present serious burdens on the sustainability of the Korean economy. The
contagion effect, initially unexpected, from the collapse of currency/financial markets in

12

Mishkin argues that an international lender of last resort such as the IMF is needed to cope with financial
crises in emerging economies where external debt is denominated in foreign currencies and to address institutional
inadequacies in dealing with expansionary monetary policy after the crisis. See Frederic S. Mishkin, Lessons from
the Asian Crisis, 18 J. OF INT’L MONEY AND FINANCE 709, 714 (1999). However, the international lender of last
resort will produce better outcome only when it acts quickly, free of moral hazard, and as a fair third party to
provide the necessary momentum for microeconomic reform and change. Id.
13
A series of strong critics on the IMF conditionality imposed on the Asian countries during the 1997-8
crisis have been presented in: JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); JAGDISH
BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2007); and Paul Krugman, Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang:
Some Analytical Notes, 29 J. OF DEV. ECON. 253 (1988), among others.
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Thailand in July 1997 and its neighboring countries immediately afterwards aggravated the
Korean problems with unfortunate ill-timing. Each of Korea’s main mistakes will be overviewed
briefly.

A.

Foreign Borrowing with Currency and Maturity Mismatch and International Debt
Mismanagement
One of the major challenges for developing countries such as in the Korean economy,

with inadequate domestic saving in spite of their relatively high savings rates, is how to
optimally and efficiently finance the nation's economic development with foreign capital and
saving.14 Although foreign capital has played a very important role in accelerating economic
growth in less developed countries, there are inherent risks on relying on too much and/or
inadequate sources of foreign capital, which can result in an unsustainable build-up of foreign
debt (a so-called debt crisis) or various forms of financial/currency crises.
On the other hand, capital inflows, which are desperately needed to finance economic
development, may generate various negative effects on the economy. Part of the capital will go
to consumption, instead of investment, increase aggregate demand, and create inflationary
pressure. Capital inflows appreciate real exchange rates and, consequently, generate a deficit in
the current account. Such current account deficits and large foreign borrowing significantly
increase the vulnerability of the economy to variations in international capital flows. When
further foreign borrowing is induced to finance the deficits and is composed of short-term and
volatile sources, the vulnerability becomes even greater. Foreign investors may overreact to any
unfavorable, domestic and international developments and withdraw their funds quickly. Thus
capital inflows, which have been vital for economic growth, could become the country's

14

See Figure 2, infra.
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weakness. The vulnerability will be compounded if the domestic banking system is weak and is
not able to withstand a reversal of capital flows. Unfortunately, this was the case in Korea.
Excluding the current financial crisis, Korea's macroeconomic performance until the third
quarter of 1997 was broadly positive. There were, however, unfavorable developments in other
areas immediately before Korea was hit hard in October and November 1997, most
conspicuously the bankruptcies of chaebols and the increasing trade deficits. Subdued import
demand and the plummeting prices of DRAMs15 caused the widened current account deficits
since 1994, especially in 1996 and 1997. The current account deficit in 1996 reached $23.3
billion or almost 6 percent of GDP, as shown in Table 1. The deficits were financed mostly by
foreign borrowing of banks and financial institutions along with portfolio investment by foreign
investors to Korea.
In the 1990s, a number of highly leveraged conglomerates (called chaebols) went
bankrupt.16 This was caused by excessive investment — such as steel and automobiles — labor
strikes, and weakened profitability of exporting firms due to worsened terms of trade and the
appreciated Korean won. The bankruptcies severely weakened the financial system and resulted
in the accumulation of non-performing loans. The exodus of foreign capital invested in Korean
stocks and securities and the successive downgrade of Korea's sovereign rating by international
credit rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor's and Moody's, exacerbated the confusing crisis
situation. Abrupt and massive outflows of foreign capital from Korea made it problematic to
maintain an optimal level of international reserves and sharply tightened the availability of

15

DRAM, or Dynamic Random Access Memory, is computer memory chip (a semiconductor product)
which is vital to the Korean economy.
16
A series of chaebol bankruptcies started from the collapse of Hanbo Iron and Steel (1990), followed by
Kia Motor, Jinro, Sammi, Haitai and Halla (1996 and 1997). See generally Chung H. Lee et al., Chaebols,
Financial Liberalization and Economic Crisis: Transformation of Quasi-Internal Organization of Korea, 16 ASIAN
ECON. J. 17 (2002).
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external finance in the international financial market, which was already contaminated by Asian
flu started in Thailand in July 1997. Although strong fundamentals and the relatively sound
public sector make the Korean case different from the Latin American debt crisis in the early
1990s and the Mexican crisis in December 1994, unmonitored over-borrowing and
mismanagement of international liquidity brought Korea to the crisis outbreak.
As Figure 2 depicts, the accumulated current account deficits and over-investment during
the pre-crisis period in Korea had to be compensated by foreign saving. Portfolio investment and
borrowing foreign funds with short-term maturities by the financial institutions brought in
foreign capital quickly, but this capital was riskier due to currency and maturity mismatch and
the high probability of its reversal in direction during a future crisis. At the end of 1997, Korea’s
total external debt had accumulated to $174 billion which is 33.7 percent of Korea’s GDP.
Among them, total short-term external debt amounted to more than $100 billion, or 58 percent of
the total, while usable international reserve held by the Bank of Korea were only $9.1 billion.17
Accordingly, by then it was not feasible for Korea to handle the “double mismatch” problems on
its own. The majority (70-80 percent) of bank borrowing from abroad was conducted with shortterm maturities of one year or shorter. The mismatch problems stemmed significantly from the
inefficient surveillance and supervision of financial institutions in Korea, especially merchant
banks.

17

See Figure 1, infra. The official volume of international reserve assets held by the Bank of Korea right
before the Korean crisis in November 1997 was more than $32 billion. However, the majority of the reserve assets
were not readily available since they were lent out to overseas branches of the Korean commercial banks as their
operating capital.
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The Controversial Government-Business Risk Partnership: Moral Hazard and Implicit
Guarantees
One of the most distinctive characteristics of the “Korean model” of economic

development during the last four decades is the government-business partnership.18 Since the
early 1960s when an export-oriented economic development strategy was adopted, the Korean
government has provided preferential loans through government controlled banks, tax (and tariff)
favors, and repayment guarantees (explicit and implicit) to foreign lenders.

Although the

government-business partnership worked remarkably well during the early stage of economic
development with an efficient allocation of limited resources and credit, the partnership started to
show flaws, especially the government partnership with Korea’s family-owned business groups,
or chaebols. The 30 chaebols had significant shares of ownership in commercial banks and nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), and exercised their influence in the financial sector.
Corporate financing in Korea became heavily dependent on banks and NBFIs. As a result,
alternative sources of financing, such as direct financing through the issue of corporate bonds
and commercial papers, had not become significant sources until the early 1990s. Most of the
chaebols used NBFIs heavily, especially merchant banks, to borrow funds from abroad. This is
because merchant banks were not regulated properly, unlike commercial banks, in their dealings
with short-term, high risk foreign borrowing.
Chaebols were the major benefactors of Korea’s government-controlled credit allocation,
financial liberalization policy, and various export-promotion measures.

Several bail-out

measures of near-bankrupt chaebols in earlier years created a false belief that the government

18

See Aoki et al., supra note 9.
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would implicitly guarantee against their bankruptcy in any event.19 At the same time, foreign
lenders believed there was relatively little default risk for chaebol loans since the government
would pick up near-default loans. It created a “too-big-to-fail” dilemma for chaebols in Korea.20
This nonmarket-based and high cost government-chaebol relationship became one of the main
contributing factors to the problems of over-investment, low profitability, and increasing nonperforming loans (NPLs), which culminated on the eve of the Korean crisis in November 1997.21
The Sequence and Timing of Financial Liberalization: Ill-Prepared and Hurried22

C.

Until the early 1990s, foreign capital contributed to the continued rapid growth of the
Korean economy, which was also aided by the favorable macroeconomic environment and
current account surpluses. The Korean government restricted new foreign borrowing, especially
in public loans and commercial loans, but encouraged the issue of new foreign bonds as a means
to attract foreign capital. During the period from 1986 to 1992, a total of $30.4 billion of foreign
capital arrived in Korea, which was slightly less amount than the total for the previous six-year

19

See Sung Wook Joh, The Korean Corporate Sector: Crisis and Reform, in KOREA’S ECONOMIC
PROSPECTS: FROM FINANCIAL CRISIS TO PROSPERITY 116, 118-19 (O. Yul Kwon & William Shepherd, eds., 2001)
(chronicling the history of government involvement in the financial affairs of the Chaebols).
20
As of April 2001, when a series of chaebol reforms had been executed, top 10 business groups in Korea
were Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO, total asset: 92.1 tril won), Samsung (83.5), LG (58.6), SK (47.5),
Hyundai Motors (44.1), KT (30.6), Korea Highway Corp. (KHC, 28.3), Hanjin (21.0), Lotte (20.7), and POSCO
(20.5). Among them, Samsung, LG, SK, Hyundai Motors, Hanjin, and Lotte are chaebols, whereas KEPCO and
KHC are the state-owned groups, and KT and POSCO are the private groups but not controlled by the owner family.
See KOREA TRADE COMM’N., BUSINESS GROUPS UNDER REGULATIONS IN 2001 (2001) (in Korean).
21
The Korean chaebols were involved with highly leveraged business operations and over-investment in
overlapping and less promising projects. The average debt-equity ratio for the top 30 chaebols exceeded 500
percent in 1997 and reached 524 percent, which is more than double the OECD average. For the corporate
governance reform and its outcome, see Lee & Lee, supra note 10.
22
This section expands on an earlier work of mine examining the history and nature of foreign capital
inflows into Korea. See Bang Nam Jeon, The Role of Foreign Capital in the Korean Economy: A Driving Force of
Economic Development or Financial Crisis? in SERIES IN HONOR OF RAL PREBISCH AND SIR HANS SINGER, VOL.
XXIII: NICS AFTER ASIAN CRISIS (Sir Hans Singer, Neelambar Hatti and Rameshwar Tandon, eds., 2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1305682.
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period in the 1980s.23 By type, foreign bonds issued by financial institutions and private firms
increased sharply, while foreign borrowing through bank loans was significantly reduced.
Thanks to the improved investment environment in Korea, FDI increased fivefold over the
previous period to $5.6 billion.24
Consequently, the sources of foreign borrowing became well-balanced with 15 percent of
public loans, 17 percent of commercial loans, 14 percent of bank loans, 20 percent of foreign
bonds issued by financial institutions, 15 percent of equity related foreign bonds issued by
private firms, and 19 percent of FDI out of the total foreign borrowing.25

The structural

improvements in foreign borrowing had been achieved: the significant reduction in the debtservice-ratio (DSR) from 30 percent in 1987 to 5 percent in 1992, the accelerated early
repayments of foreign loans, and the diversification of foreign borrowing types as described
above.26 However, these balanced and self-disciplined capital inducement policies in Korea
started to be reversed after this period.
Since 1993, the Korean financial and capital markets became more internationalized and
open to foreign investors. For example, the Korean government relaxed the restrictions on
investing in the Korean stock market by foreign investors, in order to establish a 10 percent
foreign investment ceiling per issue and a 3 percent limitation on individual holdings per issue.27
In accordance with the OECD requirements placed on Korea as a member nation since 1994, the
stock market was opened further in 1996, raising the foreign investment ceiling to 18 percent per
23

Id.
Id.
25
Id.
26
For the history of foreign capital flows into Korea, government policies for inducing foreign capital, and
the role of foreign capital for economic development in Korea, see Bang Nam Jeon, The Role of Foreign Capital in
the Korean Economy: A Driving Force of Economic Development or Financial Crisis? in Sir Hans Singer,
Neelambar Hatti and Rameshwar Tandon, eds., XXIII SERIES IN HONOR OF RAL PREBISCH AND SIR HANS SINGER:
NICS AFTER ASIAN CRISIS (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1305682.
27
Id.
24
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issue and the individual ceiling to 4 percent.28 Aided by these financial market liberalization
measures, the amount of capital inflow into Korea had greatly increased in the years, leading up
to the crisis. During the pre-crisis period, as shown in Table 1, foreign capital inflow was
primarily in the form of portfolio investment and short-term bank loan rather than foreign direct
investment, which is more long-term and committed.29
In 1998, the ceiling on foreign investments in the stock market was lifted altogether. The
Korean market had become more favorable to foreign investment due to sweeping reforms since
the IMF stepped in to bail out Korea from its currency crisis in November 1997. Attracting
foreign investment became a policy priority, especially in the form of FDI, mergers and
acquisitions (M&A), and technology transfer.
The Korean people have, however, learned a hard lesson that as the process of financial
the deregulation and liberalization has led to a more integrated and globalized Korean capital
market, Korea also became more exposed to the volatile nature of profit-seeking capital flows
and currency risks. The roots of the capital account problems actually started to build up from
the beginning of the 1990s in the area of foreign capital inflows. This is shown in Panel II
(“External Sector”) of Table 1. FDI inflows and bond financing, which are relatively stable
sources of foreign capital, have increased steadily. Portfolio investment and borrowing by the
financial institutions, which brought in foreign capital quickly but were riskier due to the high
probability of its reversal in direction, have also increased significantly since the beginning of
the 1990s. The liberalization of capital accounts after the early 1990s proceeded swiftly and

28

Id.
Kaminsky and Reinhart find that financial liberalization and lending increases, rather than simple capital
inflows, are important predictors of banking crises. See Garciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reinhart, The Twin
Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems, 1999 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 473, 474. They
also find that when currency and naming crises occur jointly, the crises are far more severe than when they occur in
isolation. Id.
29
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aggressively with the need to pay for increasing current account deficits without adequately
preparing the domestic financial sector and the current account liberalization. The sequence of
opening domestic markets to foreign investors was reversed and the speed of liberalization was
too fast. Although Korea had actually realized the vulnerability that had built up in the area of
foreign capital inflows and the inefficient financial sector, and planned to overhaul the outmoded
financial system in the beginning of 1997, it turned out to be too late.30

D.

The Contagion Channel: Unexpected and Ignored

A remarkable feature of the Asian crisis was the speed with which it spread from
Thailand to other countries in the region, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Korea in the span of a few months. The Asian crisis started when the Thai exchange market
collapsed on July 2, 1997. The currency crisis spread to the neighboring Southeast Asian
countries. In late October, the contagion spread to the Hong Kong currency and stock markets.
Policy makers and investors in Korea did not expect that the so-called “Asian virus” would
spread to Korea.
There have been different explanations and proposals for why and how contagion spread
so quickly in the region, namely macroeconomic similarities, trade links across countries, and
cross-country financial links. Careful examination of macroeconomic indicators around the
outbreak of the currency crises in the crisis-stricken nations reveals the relative irrelevance of the
strength of macroeconomic fundamentals with the eruption and contagion of the 1997 Asian

30

In January 1997, the Presidential Commission for Financial Reform was launched and it submitted a
number of policy recommendations including improved regulation of the financial sector in Korea. See Joon-Ho
Hahm, Financial System Restructuring in Korea: The Crisis and its Resolution, in EAST ASIA’S FINANCIAL
SYSTEMS: EVOLUTION & CRISIS 109, 109 (Seiichi Masuyama et al., eds., 1999).
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crisis.31 The swift and global-scale contagion of the Asian crises seems to support financial
links, rather than trade links, as the key channel of contagion. The occurrence of a crisis in one
country may induce global investors to rebalance their portfolios for various reasons. In the
world of financially linked nations, shifts in investor sentiment or increased risk aversion can
play an important role in the spread of crises.
The major indicators of financial crises and contagion include volatile movements in the
exchange rate, the depletion of international reserves, sharply rising short-term interest rates and
falling stock market prices. During the major financial crises of the 1990s, these financial
variables moved significantly in many of the affected countries. These indicators, therefore, may
identify other countries affected by contagion. Stock markets in the region, in particular, were
found to play an important role in transmitting initial and local shocks beyond their country of
origin to other emerging economies during the 1997 crisis.32
The first channel of spreading crises via stock market contagion is the erosion of investor
confidence by investors. A decline in confidence caused by a currency crisis in the crisis-origin
country results in falling stock prices with greater volatility. Stock market linkages provide an
effective path for the spread of eroded confidence across countries. Stock market linkages also
work as an indirect channel of contagion through the role of foreign investors.

31

Liquidity

See, e.g., Robert Chang and Andres Velasco, The Asian Liquidity Crisis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 6796, 1998), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=226387.
32
Using high-frequency data of foreign exchange rates, interest rates, and stock market indices of the
hardest hit countries in the region — Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea, in separate studies Jeon and Chiang
provide evidence of financial linkages across countries as a channel of contagion for currency crises in the case of
the 1997 Asian crisis. See Bang Nam Jeon, Financial Links and Contagion in the 1997 Asian Currency Crisis: An
Empirical Examination, 86 CONTEMPORARY S TUD. IN ECON. AND F IN. ANALYSIS 101 (2005); see also Thomas C.
Chiang, Bang Nam Jeon & Huimin Li, Dynamic Correlation Analysis of Financial Contagion: Evidence from Asian
Countries, 26 J. OF INT’L M ONEY AND F IN. 1206 (2007).
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difficulties facing international investors as a result of currency crises also force the investors to
liquidate their positions in other national markets, consequently spreading the crises.33
The common lender problems of the Japanese investors in Southeast Asia, portfolio
rebalancing across countries by international fund managers, and American and Japanese banks’
refusal to roll over their loans to Korean financial institutions are all additional factors which
contributed to the financial contagion from Southeast Asia to Korea. The Korean economy and
policy makers did not have the proper tools and preparation to minimize the contagion channels
of cross-country financial linkages.

IV.

EFFICIENT AND SUCCESSFUL CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND REFORM — A BENCH-MARKING
CASE
The process of post-crisis reform and recovery in Korea was successful and swift. One of

the most important contributing factors for Korea’s successful and quick recovery from the
1997-98 crisis was the establishment of effective crisis resolution mechanisms. The resolution of
weak banks and financial institution requires: (1) diagnostic reviews of bank portfolios; (2) the
identification of viable and nonviable banks; (3) the resolution of nonviable banks; (4) the quick
clean-up of toxic/bad assets and nonperforming loans (NPLs) from troubled financial
institutions; and (5) the recapitalization of viable banks and the protection of depositors in order
to regain confidence in the banking system. For the first three tasks, the Financial Supervisory
Commission (FSC) was established as an independent, consolidated supervisory authority for
banks, securities houses and insurance companies;34 for the later two tasks (4) and (5), two state-

33

For empirical evidence of the unique role of international credit rating agencies in affecting domestic and
cross-country stock markets, along with the contagion effects, during the 1997 Asian crisis period, see Huimin Li,
Bang Nam Jeon, Seong-Yeon Cho, and Thomas C. Chiang, The Impact of Sovereign Rating Changes and Financial
Contagion on Stock Market Returns: Evidence from Five Asian Countries, 19 GLOBAL FIN. J. 46 (2008).
34
See History of Fin. Svcs. Comm’n, http://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/ab/ab0302.jsp (last visited March 15, 2010).
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owned corporations — the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO)35 and the Korea
Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC)36 —were established immediately after the 1997 crisis
erupted. More detailed discussion follows.

A.

Banking reform: Maintaining a Competitive, Efficient and Well-Regulated Financial
System to be Protected From International Contagion
Significant restructuring took place immediately after the crisis in both the banking and

non-banking sectors in Korea. Restructuring of the financial system took off in June 1998 as the
FSC ordered five of twenty major commercial banks to be closed.37 Seven other banks were
allowed to continue their operations under specific conditions imposed and were given time to
improve their capital structure. The largest two of the seven banks, Citizens Commercial Bank
and Hanil Bank, were directed to be merged as Hanvit Bank, and merger partners were found for
other three banks.38 The Korea Exchange Bank was able to improve its capital structure by
obtaining foreign capital from Germany, and the Kukmin Bank sold a large block of stocks to
Goldman Sachs.39

Two major commercial banks, Cheil Bank (or Korea First Bank when

translated) and Seoul Bank were nationalized through downsizing the capital structure and
recapitalization by the government.40

A controlling share of Cheil Bank was taken by

Newbridge Capital in 1999, an investment group in the U.S.,41 while that of Korea Exchange
Bank was obtained by Lone Star, a US private equity fund, in 2003.42 The Korean government
35

See Korea Asset Mgmt. Corp., http://kamco.or.kr/eng.html (last visited March 15, 2010).
See Korea Deposit Ins. Corp., http://www.kdic.or.kr/english/index.jsp (last visited March 15, 2010).
37
See Dookyung Kim, Bank Restructuring in Korea 147 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Policy Papers No. 6,
1999), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/plcy06e.pdf.
38
Id. at 153.
39
Id. at 152.
40
Id. at 155. Recapitalizations of Cheil Bank and Seoul Bank required a large capital injection of about 5
percent of Korea’s GDP. Id.
41
Id. at 149.
42
See Matthias Menke & Dirk Schierek, Private Equity Investments in the Banking Industry – The Case of
Lone Star and Korea Exchange Bank, 2 BANKS AND BANK SYSTEMS 22 (2007), available at
36
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also announced full deposit guarantees for all financial institutions that are covered by the KDIC.
Through the two rounds of financial restructuring, a total of eight hundred and ninety-three (or
42.5 percent of the total) insolvent financial institutions out of two thousand one hundred and
three were either closed or merged as of December 2006. Table 2 summarizes changes in the
number of financial institutions classified by group. It is notable that all of the thirty merchant
bank corporations, except one, were forced to close.
These drastic and decisive reform actions in the banking sector in Korea prevented runs
in the financial sector and helped the financial sector regain competitiveness and confidence
from foreign and domestic depositors and investors. The downward spiral of corporate defaults
and decreasing loans lasted only less than a year in Korea.

In 1999, overall lending by

commercial banks to the private sector jumped 27.0 percent in real terms, after suffering a 9.7
percent drop in the previous year. This short-term turn-around succeeded in driving mediumterm improvement as well, as evidenced by improving indicators of banking/non-banking
institutions’ performance. As Figure 3 shows, the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total
loans in Korea’s financial institutions dropped from 13.5 percent in 1998 to 1.9 percent in 2006,
and the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) capital ratio for commercial banks improved
from 7.0 percent in 1997 to 13.1 percent in 2006.43 This feature of the Korean recovery in the

http://www.businessperspectives.org/journals_free/bbs/BBS_en_2007_02_Menke.pdf (examining the success of
Lone Star’s investment in Korea Exchange Bank).
43
The BIS capital ratio is defined as a ratio of the risk-bearing capital to the risk-weighted assets, which is
an indication of the solvency of a bank. The BIS' Basel committee for international banking supervision has drawn
up global standards for capital adequacy and also established criteria for the classification of loans in terms of risk.
Korea’s domestic banks' BIS capital ratio under Basel II went up to an average of 12.94 percent as of March 31,
2009 from 12.31 percent at the end of 2008. Efforts to boost capital were made through equity issues and by tapping
the Bank Recapitalization Fund.
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financial sector is notable when compared with that of other crisis-hit countries in Asia and Latin
America.44
Challenges facing the banking reforms also emerged from several areas during the
banking reform process, including the lack of transparent criteria for classifying banks into the
viable and non-viable groups, commercial banks’ rapid switching of loan target markets from
corporate loans to consumer loans (especially credit card loans and housing loans), and moral
hazard problems by consumers.45 The acquisition procedures for some Korean banks became
controversial in later years due to a lack of transparency and sizable profits.46 Korea also faced
increasing government debt and deficit problems. The government deficit increased from 1.4
percent of GDP in 1997 to 3.5 percent and 2.3 percent in 1998 and 1999, respectively.47 As a
result, the central government debt increased from 8.8 percent of GDP in 1996 to 18.5 percent in
1999.48

B.

Establishing an Effective Non-Performing Asset Management Mechanism, such as the
Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO)
When the Korean economy was hit by the crisis at the end of 1997, the Korean

government responded quickly by launching financial reform programs — public funds were
injected to bail out troubled banks and financial institutions, and banking restructuring was
44

See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (May 1999) available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/1999/01/, for comparative studies of international financial contagion and
the recovery process in crisis-hit countries in Asia.
45
For more details for the banking, financial and corporate reforms in Korea and the challenges for the
reforms from different perspectives, see Koo & Kiser, supra note 4. See also Wonhyuk Lim and Joon-Ho Hahm,
Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity: The Political Economy of Korea’s Financial Sector Reform, in FROM CRISIS
TO OPPORTUNITY: FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND EAST ASIAN CAPITALISM 83 (Jongryn Mo & Daniel I. Okimoto,
eds.,
2006),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2006/01northkorea_lim/lim20060324.pdf (2006); Lee & Lee,
supra note 10.
46
Lone Star was attempting to sell its equity in Korea Exchange Bank to Kookmin Bank, but has faced
criminal investigations from Korean regulators for stock manipulation, among other charges.
47
See Table 1, infra.
48
Id.
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pursued aggressively. One of the key tasks was to resolve non-performing loans. Legislation
was passed in August 1997 to establish the NPA Management Fund, and KAMCO was created
in November 1997.49 At the same time, the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) was
also expanded and recharged to be able to provide financial support for troubled financial
institutions through recapitalizations, liquidity injection and loss redemption for financial
institutions. In addition, the KDIC expanded the depositor protection program immediately after
the crisis erupted by temporarily covering all depositors for three years until December 2000.
KAMCO carried out its task of resolving non-performing loans (NPLs) efficiently and
contributed to the efficient restructuring of the financial industry in Korea during the post-1997
crisis period.50 The role of KAMCO has been five-fold: (1) the management and operation of
the Non-Performing Assets Fund; (2) the acquisition and resolution of NPAs from financial
institutions; (3) the implementation of work-out programs for distressed companies; (4) the
management of government-owned properties and resolution of tax arrears; and (5) supporting
the recovery of consumer credit. One of the major functions of KAMCO was to acquire and
dispose of NPLs from financially distressed financial institutions and companies under
rehabilitation plans.51
During the post-crisis period of 1997-2006, KAMCO paid a total of 38.8 trillion won to
purchase a total of 111 trillion won of NPLs in face value.52 KAMCO applied various methods
49

See supra note 35. KAMCO was actually expanded and converted from former so-called Seongup
Kongsa which had been helping financial institutions to recover bad-performing loans. It was not until December
31, 1999 that the name was changed to KAMCO. KAMCO is a public asset management company like the RTC
(U.S.), Securum (Sweden), Arsenal (Finland) and Danaharta (Malaysia). KAMCO is similar to RTC in the US in
the sense that both try to dispose of NPL as fast as possible rather than to maximize recovery rate. However,
KAMCO began to put more emphasis on the recovery rate by using various kinds of restructuring devices.
Moreover, KAMCO established its own CRC and CRV, which are joint-ventures with foreign investment banks
such as Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter, Sonnenblick Goldman and (prior to 2008) Lehman Brothers.
50
See Figure 4, infra.
51
Supra note 49.
52
See Table 3, infra.
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to dispose of the NPLs effectively and a total of 41.5 trillion won was recovered as of the end of
2006.53 Therefore, KAMCO recovered more than the amount that was originally injected in the
Fund, minimizing the tax payer’s burden. This is one of the success stories in the NPL disposal
that can be emulated by others.54 On the other hand, the KDIC raised a total of 95.5 trillion won
and spent a total of 130 trillion won for bank recapitalization activities (63.5 trillion won),
liquidity injection for weak financial institutions (18.5 trillion won), deposit insurance payments
(30.3 trillion won), and purchasing troubled assets (17.3 trillion won). About two-thirds of the
public funds were raised through bonds issues by KAMCO and KDIC. The Korean government
financed the deficit of the funds for financial restructuring through a special budget, foreignborrowed funds, and a government-owned property management fund, among other methods.
This amounted to 22.6 trillion won as of August 2001. In sum, as shown in Table 3, KAMCO
and KDIC’s fiscal support for financial restructuring during the period of November 1997December 2006 amounted to 168.4 trillion won. ($181 billion based on the won/dollar exchange
rate as of Dec 2006, or 19.0 percent of 2006 GDP, or 34.2 percent of 1997 GDP.) More than 50
percent of the public funds injected have been recovered as of December 2006, as shown in
Figure 5, through the efficient implementation of maintinance, sales and transfer of public funds
projects.
There are a few noteworthy points here. First, although Korea had no experience and/or
expertise in handling such a massive amount of NPLs, the task was done swiftly and
successfully. Second, when KAMCO disposed of a massive volume of NPLs purchased at a
discount, it used various innovative ways to obtain the highest possible returns — public
53

See KAMCO, W HITE P APER ON NON -P ERFORMING LOANS RESOLUTION FUND (2004).
Current South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak has opined to this effect. See Lee Myung-Bak, Op-Ed.,
How Korea Solved Its Banking Crisis: The World Can Learn from Our Experience in the Late ‘90s, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 27, 2009, at A11.
54
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auctions, direct sales, international tenders, adopting Corporate Restructuring Vehicles (CRVs)
or Corporate Restructuring Companies (CRCs),55 issuing asset-backed securities (ABS), and
debt-equity swaps. Third, the NPL problem of financial institutions in Korea was addressed
quickly and decisively. Only two days after the KAMP was established, it purchased a total of
4.4 trillion won worth of NPLs from Cheil Bank (or Korea First Bank) and Seoul Bank at 2.9
trillion won. KAMCO purchased a total face value of 99.5 trillion of NPLs until August 2001
and paid 38.2 trillion won. Fourth, the bail-out measures should have built-in exit measures with
clear time frames. A plan for handing over government-owned nationalized banks to the private
sector at the earliest convenience is a must. Fifth, although the bail-out plans were executed
promptly and decisively, the plans were flexible and adaptable.

KAMCO and KDIC also

injected needed short-term liquidity to merchant banks and other financial institutions by using
repurchasing agreements of lower-preferred bonds issued by troubled banks and by providing
direct loans to them.
KAMCO’s various NPL disposal approaches had other positive effects. Financial
intermediaries such as CRV’s were adopted in Korea for the first time.

The merger and

acquisition market was stimulated, and corporate restructuring methods became more
sophisticated. Korea’s experience in NPL resolutions with KAMCO became a role model to
other countries in Asia and Eastern Europe. Recently the Korean government has allowed
KAMCO to invest in overseas MPC markets.

55

The corporate restructuring company (CRC) is a Korean version of a vulture fund, specializing in the
restructuring of distressed companies, and the Corporate Restructuring Vehicle (CRV) is a vehicle especially for
restructuring workout companies. The CRC is based on The Industrial Development Act (May 1999), while The
Act on Corporate Restructuring Vehicles (May 1999) defined CRV as a paper company in the form of mutual fund
which pools distressed assets of financial institutions and transfers them to asset management company for
specialized management.
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It is worthwhile to examine how KAMCO dealt with assets and liabilities for troubled
banks. When it purchased NPLs from troubled banks it paid a fair price with a reasonable
discount. For example, KAMCO paid 38.2 trillion won from its inception in November 1997 to
August 2001 to purchase assets with a collective face value of 99.5 trillion won. The discount
rate is, on average, 65 percent. The asset-liability purchase procedures for exiting banks were
different. To minimize the adverse impact of a bank’s bankruptcy procedure on the market value
of the processed bank and its customers, KAMCO used the so-called Purchase and Assumption
(P&A) method under which bankruptcy procedures would be followed only after transferring the
assets and liabilities of the processed bank to acquiring banks. The acquiring banks assumed
only good assets while KAMCO acquired the remaining bad assets at a significant discount. For
the smooth transfer of assets and liabilities of exit banks, the Korean government, in cooperation
with the FSC, established special-purpose bridge banks, such as Hanahreum Merchant Bank and
Hanahreun Fund, and new banks such as Hanaro Merchant Bank.
KAMCO assessed the risk level of NPLs and classified them into three levels — normal
loans, special loans and workout loans. Special loans were the loans to firms undergoing the
bankruptcy procedure with courts, workout loans were the loans to firms subject to workout
agreements with the bank, and the rest were considered normal loans. Each loan was also
classified as either collateralized or uncollateralized. The purchasing price of a normal loan by
KAMCO was the market price of the underlying collateral, i.e., the effective collateral value
multiplied by the average bidding acceptance rate. The effective rate was the assessed price of
the collateral minus liens, and the average bidding acceptance rate was the court bid price of the
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same kind/market assessed price. Non-collateral normal loans were purchased at 3 percent of the
face value of the loan, which was increased to 9 percent in 1999.56

C.

Corporate Sector Reform: Chaebol Reform and Corporate Governance

The Korean crisis in 1997-98 showed that the highly leveraged and vulnerable corporate
sector was one of the key contributing factors to outbreak and depth of the banking crisis, caused
by accumulated NPLs and over-borrowing from foreign sources. A liquidity crunch and the
deepened recession during the post-crisis period hurt the corporate sector even more. This
downward spiral of events needed to be broken. In particular, chaebols, which are characterized
by closed ownership within the family of the founder and a highly diversified business structure,
became the core target of corporate sector reform.
In January 1998, the Korean government and major chaebols agreed to reform the
business practices of the chaebols.57 Since then many drastic changes in business practices have
been implemented, such as the improvement of transparency in accounting and finance, the
increase in minority shareholders rights, and the reform of the composition of boards of
directors, among others. The Korean government and congress have introduced various laws

56

For the detailed information on purchasing prices and procedures of non-performing loans (NPLs), see
KAMCO, supra note 53, at chapter 3.
57
In early January 1998, President-elect Kim Dae-jung and the major Korean chaebols agreed to the fivepoints of the accord, which became the main targets of President Kim s chaebol policies: 1) to hold chaebol leaders
more accountable for managerial performance; 2) to boost managerial transparency; 3) to improve financial health;
4) to focus on core businesses; and 5) to eliminate loan guarantees among affiliates. A later presidential
announcement in August 1999, added three supplementary items to the chaebol reform agenda: 1) prohibiting the
domination of finance by industrial capital; 2) suppressing circular investment and unfair transactions among
chaebol affiliates; 3) preventing improper bequests or gifts to chaebol heirs. These “5+3” principles were aimed at
implementing fundamental reforms in the chaebol structure during the post-crisis period. For details, see
FEDERATION OF KOREAN INDUSTRIES, IMPLEMENTATION STATUS AND FUTURE SUBJECTS OF CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING (CEO Report Vol. 651, 2002) (in Korean).
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and regulations to induce private firms and chaebols to improve their corporate governance and
capital structures and focus on core competencies.58
First, there have been significant efforts to enhance transparency in corporate finance,
accounting and ownership structures. Beginning in 1999, chaebols were required to provide a
consolidated financial statement free from intragroup interlocking transactions.

Korea’s

accounting standards were revised to be consistent with international accounting standards,
including the requirement of an independent audit committee in all listed companies. In April
1998, the government banned affiliated chaebol firms from providing debt/payment guarantees
to other affiliated chaebol firms, or cross-debt or payment guarantees.
Second, various new rules of corporate governance were established to reduce
conglomerate structures — concentrated and interlocking ownership in a family or internal group
— to protect minority shareholders rights and to increase the transparency of the board of
directors structure by requiring all listed companies to appoint one or more outside director.
Banks also have many outside directors. These features are all typical characteristics of the
Anglo-American system of corporate governance. Third, in 1998 the government further freed
mergers and acquisition (M&A) activity and further opened domestic stock and financial markets
to foreign investors. Foreign investors were able to greatly increase their market shares and
ownership of Korean firms.59 Fourth, the capital structure of large firms in Korea has improved
and profitability has also increased during the post-crisis period. The top five chaebols were able

58

For more details on the chaebol reform in Korea, see ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING IN K OREA: REFORMING THE C HAEBOL (Stephan Haggard, Wonhyuk Lim & Euysung Kim, eds.,
2003); see also Myung-hyun Kang, Chaebol Reform and Corporate Governance, 3 KOREA ECON. RESEARCH (1999)
(in Korean).
59
For some of Korea’s representative firms, foreign stockholders hold or have held controlling stakes —
such as POSCO (66.7 percent, as of December 31, 2003), Samsung Electronics (57.3 percent), Hyundai Motors
(51.3 percent), SK Telecom (47.0 percent), and Shinsegae (48.9 percent).

2010]

LESSONS FROM KOREA’S EXPERIENCE

129

to reduce their debt-equity ratios below the 200 percent level by the end of 1999 using
recapitalization, sales of risky assets and the inducement of foreign capital investment.
Fifth, the Korean government introduced or revised bankruptcy-related laws, simplifying
legal processes for bankruptcy filings and corporate rehabilitations.60 For financially troubled
but viable firms, the government encouraged lending banks and creditors to support restructuring
efforts, instead of filing for bankruptcy and entering the liquidation process.61 The restructuring
tasks are called the “work-out” process, which include debt rescheduling, write-off or writedown of debt, providing new loans, assistance of management by experts, and streamlining core
business operations and the workforce, among others.
Finally, a drastic, but controversial government-directed corporate restructuring effort
was made by the Korean government to streamline the core competence of big chaebols in 19992000. To reduce excess capacity and overlapping investment, the government proposed a series
of business swaps and consolidations in various industries — such as the semiconductor,
petrochemical, aerospace, railway vehicle, power-generator/ship-engine, oil refining, electronics,
and automobile industries. The initiative was called “business swap” or “big deal.”62 Some of
the largest chaebols, including Daewoo, were allowed to fail. The government revised “The
Industry Development Law” in January 1999 to allow Corporate Restructuring Companies
(CRCs) to provide services for planning and implementing restructuring projects with investors,

60

The bankruptcy law and workout laws were introduced earlier in 1962, and they were revised and used
heavily after the 1997 crisis in Korea. See Yongjae Lim, The Corporate Bankruptcy System and the Economic
Crisis, in, HAGGARD ET AL., supra note 58, at 207. The number of corporations filing for corporate workout was
only 22 before 1996, but jumped to 322 and 728 in 1997 and 1998, respectively. See KAMCO, supra note 53.
61
To facilitate corporate restructuring, the government launched a corporate restructuring fund of 1.6 trillion won in
October 1998. Domestic banks also reached an agreement on June 25, 1998, called “The Financial Institution
Agreement for the Enhancement of the Corporate Restructuring.”
62
For the background and processes of the big deals in detail, see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND
DEV., REGULATORY REFORM IN KOREA: THE ROLE OF COMPETITION POLICY IN REGULATORY REFORM (2000),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/38/32481170.pdf.
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and introduced the Corporate Restructuring Vehicles (CRV) Act to streamline the management
of workout on behalf of creditor financial institutions.
As a result, Korean firms become stronger and less vulnerable to crisis-type shocks
coming from domestic and foreign markets. The debt-equity ratio of chaebols dropped from
more than 500 percent during the pre-crisis period to less than 200 percent during the post-crisis
period. Korean firms also experienced increased transparency, efficiency and profitability.63

V.

A STILL VULNERABLE KOREA ADDRESSES THE 2008-09 CRISIS

A decade later, the Korean economy is facing another crisis. The current crisis has
spilled over from the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, rather than from the Southeast Asian
currency and banking crises that started in 1997. Korea’s real GDP growth rate dropped to 2.2
percent in 2008 from higher than 5 percent level during the previous two years;64 investments in
facilities and construction have been shrunk; and real wage rates have declined.65 In the external
side of the Korean economy, the current account turned from positive to negative in 2008; the
capital account reached a record level of deficits amounting to $51 billion in 2008 caused by
massive foreign capital outflows from stock and bond investments; and international reserves

63

For an empirical analysis of the impact of corporate reforms on efficiency and profitability of Korean
firms, see Kineung Choo et al., Performance Changes of the Business Groups Over Two decades: Technological
Capabilities and Investment Inefficiency in Korean Chaebols, 57 ECON. DEV. AND CULTURAL CHANGE 359
(2009).
64
See Table 1, infra. In 2008, Korea’s third and fourth quarter GDP growth rates (0.2 percent and -5.1
percent, respectively) were lower than the previous two quarters (5.8 percent and 4.8 percent, respectively). In
2009, the Korean economy showed a sign of turn-around with 0.1 percent, 2.6 percent, and 2.9 percent of real GDP
growth rates for the first three quarters, respectively. The International Monetary Fund increased its projection of
Korea’s growth from 1.5 percent to 3.6 percent on October 30, 2009.
65
Korean household and banking sectors have proven to be relatively less vulnerable to a decline in
housing prices since 2007. The main reasons include that during 2005-2007, the Korean government controlled
housing prices by imposing price ceilings on new apartments and reducing the price of publicly built housing, raised
taxes on capital gains, and limited bank lending for mortgages. As of 2008, mortgages account for 40 percent of
household liabilities in Korea, compared with the U.S. share of around 75 percent. See Myung-koo Kang, Global
Financial Crisis and Systematic Risks in the Korean Banking Sector (Korea Economic Institute Academic Paper
Series, Vol. 4, No. 35, 2009).
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dropped from $262 billion in 2007 to $201 billion at the end of 2008. The Korean banks
suffered from an acute foreign currency liquidity crunch in 2008 as the Korean won depreciated
more than 25 per cent against the dollar during the same year. Their troubles have prompted the
Korean government to take action by announcing a $130 billion bailout fund (about 14 percent
of GDP) in October 2008,66 while the Bank of Korea has been cutting the interest rate and
buying their bonds since early 2008.67
The current crisis is different from the previous one in its origin, contagion channel,
nature and scope. The Korean economy, however, is believed to be better prepared for this
crisis. Korea has accumulated large international reserves, after a brief period of setback,
reaching $254 billion as of September 2009, which is sufficient to pay out all short-term external
debt (about $152 billion), compared to $30 billion (only $9 billion of the readily available
portion) in 1997. Banks and non-bank financial institutions are now better capitalized with the
BIS capital ratio over 13 percent, compared with lower than 7 percent in 1997. Korean firms
have a sounder balance sheet structure with debt-equity ratio of lower than 200 percent,
compared with more than 400 percent in 1997. Corporate finance is more transparent, corporate
governance has improved vastly, and the legal system for corporate restructuring and workout is
in better shape, thanks to the extensive reform efforts during the post-crisis period. However, the
Korean economy has shown signs of vulnerability in a few areas – some are new and some are
recurring.

66

This rescue package includes debt guarantees. In addition, Korea’s Financial Services Commission
(FSC) announced the creation of a 40 trillion won ($36.3 billion) Finance Stability Fund as a contingency plan and a
backup measure to the bank capitalization fund of the 20 trillion won ($18.1 billion) fund.
67
The Bank of Korea (BOK) dropped the BOK base rate gradually from 5 percent in early 2008 to 2
percent in February 2009. The BOK changed its monetary policy target interest rate from overnight call rates to
BOK base rates in March 2008.
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First, the Korean economy is more exposed to foreign shocks now than a decade ago due
to the implementation of liberalization measures during the post-crisis period. Foreign investors
play a more important role in setting prices and leading market trends in the financial markets,
and foreign firms have increased their shares of ownership.68 The spillover effects of foreign
shocks to the domestic economy and businesses have increased significantly through this new
channel of contagion. The Korean government needs to establish an efficient surveillance and
monitoring system for foreign capital, especially volatile forms such as speculative and highly
leveraged portfolio investment activities by foreign investors.
Second, Korea’s external sector has become weaker in recent years. The current account
has reversed its position from surplus to deficits, and capital and financial accounts have turned
to the negative position. Korea’s net portfolio investment balance shifted from surplus (net
inflow) to deficit (net outflow) since 2006, more conspicuously during the current global
financial crisis period.69 Consequentially, Korea’s external debt has increased significantly,
reaching more than $380 billion, which is about 40 percent of Korea’s GDP. Furthermore, the
maturity structure of the external debt has worsened; as the ratio of short-term debt in total
external debt has increased beyond the 40 percent level, which is approaching the 1997-98
level.70 In the capital account, by composition, large deficits in foreign direct investment and
portfolio investment positions have been compensated by large amounts of borrowing by banks.
Branches of foreign banks in Korea have been observed to borrow a significant portion of total
bank borrowing. This is reminiscent of over-borrowing by merchant banks during the pre-1997
crisis period, which was one of the important contributing factors for the 1997 crisis. The impact

68

See Figure 6, infra.
See Figure 7, infra.
70
See Figure 8, infra.
69
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of the increased foreign bank penetration in emerging economies has been debated in the
banking literature.71 To maximize the positive role and minimize the negative role of foreign
banks, effective banking regulations and a surveillance system for foreign banks are called for.72
Third, although the amount of international reserves has increased significantly, its
maturity structure and asset/currency composition have not been managed efficiently. The
increasing volatility of the Korean won with respect to the U.S. dollar and Japanese won have
put significant burdens on the exports of Korean firms and their profitability. To defend the
value of the Korean won in the foreign exchange market, the Bank of Korea has had to use the
significant portions of its international reserves in recent months, which has created large
volatility in the balance of international reserve assets. It will become important more than
before to maintain a stable level of international reserves and seek an optimal composition of
international reserve assets by asset type and currency denomination.
Fourth, several new domestic agenda have emerged in the Korean economy while coping
with the 2008-09 global economic crises. The new agenda include a need for further labor
market reform, shift of the bank loan market from commerce loans to consumer loans, a credit
card bubble, increasing household debt, speculation in the housing sector, and lackluster
investments in the corporate sector.73 The government debt also increased to 35.6 percent of

71

For the implication of increased foreign bank penetration on monetary policy transmission mechanism in
emerging economies, see Ji Wu, Alina Luca & Bang Nam Jeon, Foreign Bank Penetration and the Lending Channel
in Emerging Economies: Evidence from Bank-level Panel Data (forthcoming 2010).
72
The Korean government has applied strict regulations on liquidity, risk management and internal
management to domestic financial institutions participating in foreign exchange markets. (e.g., THE REGULATION
ON SUPERVISION OF BANKING BUSINESS, enacted in April 1998 and amended in May 2007) However, as of May
2009, there are no specific rules or regulations that can properly monitor and supervise the real-time, short-term
capital flows by domestic branches of foreign banks in Korea. See Kang (2009), ibid., p. 11.
73
For new challenges for the Korean economy facing the 2008-09 global financial crisis, see Pyo Hak-kil,
Global Financial Crisis and the Korean Economy: Issues and Perspectives, 25 KOREA’S ECONOMY 8 (2009),
available at http://www.keia.org/Publications/KoreasEconomy/2009/PYO.pdf.
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GDP due to the increased government deficit.74 Since the Korean economy has become more
dynamic and interlinked among its sub-sectors, vulnerability built up in any sector of the
economy could trigger bubble-bursting and/or self-fulfilling down spiral phenomena, which
could lead to a crisis.

VI.

ENHANCING REGIONAL FINANCIAL COOPERATION IN EAST ASIA75

In retrospect, there have been various sources of dissatisfaction within the region in
dealing with the 1997-98 crisis, which played a role in enhancing cooperation on economic and
financial agenda among Asian countries during the post-crisis period. Those main sources of
dissatisfaction include: (1) unprepared financial liberalization which led to an excessive influx
of short-term foreign capital and a lack of risk hedging vehicles, (2) volatile currency trading and
speculative activities by Western investors and difficulty in establishing an appropriate exchange
rate regime in light of such volatility and significant exchange rate misalignments, (3)
inappropriate, excessive, and uniform one-size-fits-all prescriptions imposed by the IMF as socalled IMF conditionality, ignoring country-specific elements of the root-causes of the crisis, the
crisis situation, and crisis management, and (4) the lack of sufficient and prompt liquidity
support from inside and outside the region in the early stages of the crisis and the lack of selfhelp mechanisms within the region.
A collective and regional approach is believed to serve better than an individualistic
approach to manage crises. Some academics have argued that if East Asian nations had shown
74

The projected government deficit in 2009 is 51 trillion won, which is 5.0 percent of GDP. This is still
lower than the U.S. (13.6 percent), Japan (9.9 percent), and U.K. (9.8 percent). The expected accumulated
government debt in the end of 2009 is 366 trillion won (35.6% of GDP). Korea’s government debt ratio to GDP is
still much lower than Japan (217 percent), Italy (115 percent), and the United States (87 percent).
75
Part of this section is from an updated version of Bang Nam Jeon, Progress and Prospects of Regional
Financial Arrangements and Cooperation: A Critical Survey, presented at the International Finance Seminar,
ADBI/ADB, Penang, Malaysia (July 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1305688.
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more solidarity in responding to the initial crisis in 1997, especially in defending the values of
Asian currencies from the attack of speculative hedge funds, the severity of the crisis might have
been reduced. Having suffered from the havoc of the economic crises of 1997, many countries
in East Asia started to realize the urgent need for regional financial and monetary cooperation
(also known as RFC/RMC) in order to prevent the reoccurrence of a similar crisis in the region
in the future. The East Asian economies seem to be more prepared for the RFC/RMC initiatives
by experiencing more intra-regional trade and investment in recent years and accumulating a
significant amount of international reserve assets held by monetary authorities in East Asia.76 A
regional framework has been taking shape as a consequence of the AMF proposal, the Manila
Framework and the Chiang Mai Initiative.

Here are brief accounts of each of the three

initiatives.
In September 1997, Japan proposed an “Asian Monetary Fund” (AMF) to prevent the
reoccurrence of another Asian financial crisis and to institutionalize financial cooperation among
the countries in the region. Strong objections from the U.S. and the IMF, among other reasons,
almost killed the idea of the AMF, leading to no further tangible progress toward establishing a
regional monetary institution in East Asia — although there has been heated debate on how to
prevent and manage further crises in the region. The main argument was that it would overlap
with the IMF and lead to an increased moral hazard problem.77
In November 1997, a new framework for an improved RFC, called the “Manila
Framework” was announced in a meeting of finance ministers and central bankers from 14 Asia76

As of September 2009, China holds the world largest value of international reserves ($2,273 billion),
followed by Japan ($1,052 billion), Russia ($413 billion), Saudi Arabia ($395 billion), Taiwan ($332 billion), India
($280 billion), and Korea ($254 billion). The four East Asian nations hold more than 45 percent of world total
international reserve assets. See Data Template on International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity, Int’l
Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/ir/colist.htm (last visited March 15, 2010).
77
For more detail, see ASIAN DEV. BANK, STUDY ON MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COOPERATION IN EAST
ASIA (SUMMARY REPORT) (May 2002), available at http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/kokkin/tyousa/tyou056.pdf.
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Pacific countries in Manila to discuss further responses to the Asian financial crisis.78 The
Manila Framework included the following four initiatives:

(1) regional surveillance of

macroeconomic policies, foreign exchange policies, and relevant financial systems in member
nations, (2) providing technical assistance for strengthening the financial sector in the region, (3)
pushing for the restructuring of the IMF to cope with financial crises, including the enhancement
of the effectiveness of the New Arrangement to Borrow and reconsidering the access limit within
the IMF financial program for the provision of short-term loans to troubled economies, and (4)
establishing cooperative financing support arrangements to stabilize Asian currencies and serve
as a complementary financing source for IMF-supported programs to the Asian countries and for
incremental international reserves of an economy in need of emergency liquidity support. 79 The
Manila Framework was reinforced by the New Miyazawa Initiative, which prepared funds
amounting to ￥3 trillion (approximately $30 billion) to be used for short-term liquidity support
and long-term bilateral assistance to troubled member nations.
The search for regional financial arrangements gained momentum in May 2000, when the
ASEAN + 3 finance ministers agreed to expand the existing network of swap arrangements by
including all ASEAN countries, China, Japan, and Korea, designed to better withstand future
financial crises by helping central banks of other countries in the region. 80 The government-togovernment currency swap deal provides that one country may borrow funds from the other

78

The 14 member nations of the Manila Framework are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, China,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the U.S.
79
See THE CHAIRMAN’S SUMMARY OF THE 8TH FINANCE AND CENTRAL BANK DEPUTIES MEETING OF THE
MANILA FRAMEWORK GROUP (2001), available at http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/if037.htm.
80
See The Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting, May 6, 2000, Chiang
Mai, Thailand, available at http://www.aseansec.org/635.htm (outlining a plan for increased cooperation across the
region aimed at dealing with regional financial issues).
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country in the contract which has the effect of building up a country’s foreign exchange
reserves.81
This plan, called the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), is considered to be as a major step
toward strengthening financial cooperation among the East Asian countries. The rationale of the
CMI was to strengthen the self-help and support mechanisms in East Asia by establishing a
regional financing arrangement to supplement existing international facilities. Subsequently, the
ASEAN nations agreed, at the ASEAN+3 summit conference held in Singapore in November
2000, to expand the size of the multilateral currency swap facility from $200 million to $1
billion. Three bilateral currency swap agreements, between Korea and Japan ($7 billion, Korean
won and Japanese yen based), Malaysia and Japan, and Thailand and Japan, for a total of $6
billion, were also signed in May 2001. In November 2001, Korea reached an agreement with
China and Thailand to swap $2 billion and $1 billion, respectively, in case of an emergency. The
2007 ASEAN finance ministers meeting in Chiang Mai again agreed to explore an infrastructure
financing mechanism for ASEAN. No concrete agreement has been reached yet, but now seems
to be a good time to seriously explore this at the East Asia level.82 To address the 2008-09
global financial crisis, the Korean government made $30 billion worth of currency swaps with
the Federal Reserve of the United States in October 2008. It has also expanded the currency
swap amounts with Japan ($20 billion) and China (worth about $26 billion, in local currency).
The ultimate objective for establishing an RFA/RFC in East Asia should be to prevent
the recurrence of an economic crisis in the region, which is being prepared for collectively. A
specific agenda for reform will include establishing an early warning system, strengthening
81

Id.
See Chalongphob Sussangkarn, Op-Ed., East Asian Financial Cooperation Key to Crisis, ASAHI.COM
(May
26,
2009)
(original
no
longer
available),
available
at
http://www.tdri.or.th/en/pdf/chalongphob_sussangkarn_east.pdf (arguing for a regional solution to financial crisis
management).
82
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regional surveillance, establishing new, quick financing facilities as a complement to the IMF
facility, strengthening financial market supervision and regulation, and reshaping the G-8/G-20
led international financial architecture reform efforts by including capital controls and
regulations of speculative hedge funds.
So far, the several ideas and proposals for establishing RFC/RMC have faced challenges
or objections. The U.S. and European countries, along with the IMF, did not support the
Japanese attempt to establish the AMF which will pool together the resources from Asian
countries and play as a regional lender-of-last-resort (LLR). The main objections were the
AMF’s functional overlap with existing institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, and the
possibility of a serious moral hazard problem caused by the so-called “soft conditionality”, and
the lack of discipline among peer group nations in Asia. Just ten years later, these accusations
proved to be inaccurate.
The advocates of the AMF stress that Asia needs a regional LLR because global
emergency resources for East Asia, including the IMF and the World Bank, are insufficient,
considering the size of the East Asian economies in the face of volatile capital flows in and out
of the region.

Other advantages which would be presented by an Asian LLR include:

augmented sources of short-term liquidity to member nations in need of short-term assistance;
reduced probability of financial contagion in the region, which has seen increasingly linked
regional economies; the maintenance of exchange rate stability with less volatility; more accurate
familiarity with member countries’ socioeconomic, political, and cultural background; and more
reliable and updated peer reviews by insiders rather than by outsiders.
As an alternative to the AMF, a weaker form of RFC would be pooling international
reserve assets and sharing them among member nations in the region. An example of the weak
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form of resource pooling would be similar to the bilateral/ multilateral currency swap agreements
under the Chiang Mai Initiative. Another form would be a common decentralized reserve
pooling mechanism, in which each member nation contributes a specified share of its
international reserve assets to a common pool. Each country would then be eligible to draw on
the pool for an amount up to a predetermined multiple of the amount deposited. A participating
nation in the resource pooling would then be able economize on their own reserve accumulation
by gaining access to the total regional pool of liquid funds, and, as a member of the group, each
country would gain some influence over the policies of other members.
There are several obstacles to overcome for successful regional financial cooperation
among the East Asian nations. These include the diversity and heterogeneity of the countries’
economic characteristics, the wide spectrum of economic development and lack of economic
convergence in the region, and the lack of political will and commitment to regional cooperation
and integration.

Another important but practical question is who will and is able to lead

harmonious efforts toward establishing an effective and solid RFA/RFC in the region – Japan,
China, or a collective form led by participants inside and/or outside East Asia.
Based on this discussion, we may derive some practical strategies for establishing an
effective RFC scheme in the East Asian region in order to prevent the recurrence of a
financial/economic crisis and large-scale contagion in the region. First, enhance the “political
will” behind the implementation and commitment to the development of a self-help support
mechanism beyond the CMI framework in the East Asian region. Second, create an environment
of support from the IMF, ASEM (The Asia and Europe Meeting) and G-8/G-20 nations by
pushing a regional RFC scheme, such as the CMI, to be structured to complement, not oppose,
the IMF and other international institutions and eliminating moral hazard concerns by
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establishing a set of clear operational guidance and principles in extending financial facilities to
member nations. Third, convince Westerners that a regional fund could monitor and respond to
crises in the region more appropriately and swiftly than a worldwide one, and that the East Asian
countries have the commitment, ability and know-how to establish and run an independent but
supplemental RFC in East Asia by developing an effective regional surveillance system. Fourth,
present a clear vision based on a gradual and progressive approach to expanding the CMI of the
ASEAN+3 toward the AMF, or some like organization, as an Asian LLR, and the eventual
establishing of the Asian Monetary Union (AMU) in the future.

Finally, seek stable and

productive sources of foreign capital with long-term maturity, including FDI and bond-market
financing, by providing a favorable and sound environment for foreign investors.83 A long-term
strategy and vision will also lead the East Asian nations to an intensive form of regional
monetary integration, which may create an Asian monetary union and a single Asian currency in
the future.84

Korea may find a unique role in enhancing regional financial and monetary

cooperation relations among the East Asian countries.

VII.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

A recent study by Reinhart and Rogoff on the history of financial crises, covering eight
centuries of data from England’s fourteenth-century default to the 2008-09 U.S. subprime
mortgage crisis, found that financial or economic crises are a universal phenomenon and

83

See Bang Nam Jeon & Se-Young Ahn, Changing Receptivity Towards TNCs in the Republic of Korea:
Survey Results and Policy Implications, 10 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 119 (2001), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit27v10n1en.pdf (reporting on the various ways to make Korea a more attractive
environment for foreign direct investment).
84
For a feasibility study on monetary union in East Asia, see Bang Nam Jeon and Hongfang Zhang, A
Currency Union or an Exchange Rate Union: Evidence from Northeast Asia, 22 J. OF ECON. INTEGRATION 256
(2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1305660.
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frequently recurring common events.85 East Asian countries were hit hard by the 1997-98
financial crisis.

A decade later, they have been suffering again from the current global

financial/economic crises. Since financial crises are common and repeating phenomena, we may
not be able to completely avoid another round of crises in the years to come. This is a great
challenge facing the global economy, and the prevention of the recurrence of future crises is
urgently called for.
This paper focused on the Korean crises, which experienced the worst damage as well as
the most successful recovery from the 1997 crisis, and discussed the success and failure of postcrisis reform efforts while identifying vulnerable areas which need further reform.

I also

discussed specific lessons to be learned from Korea’s experience during the 1997-98 crisis in
order to help prevent the outbreak of similar financial crises in the future.
These specific lessons are, first, to monitor international capital flows carefully and to
implement efficient international debt management policies to avoid currency- and maturitymismatch; second, to maintain competitive, efficient and well-regulated banking and financial
systems that are protected from international contagion; third, to establish effective resolution
mechanisms for non-performing assets and loans, such as the Korea Asset Management
Corporation (KAMCO); and fourth, to enhance regional financial cooperation among the East
Asian countries, such as a renewed Chiang Mai Initiative to provide short-term liquidity support
when crises hit the region, or, alternatively, setting up an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) as a
lender of last resort in the Asian region.

Although past financial crises may share many

commonalities, each crisis has been shown to have idiosyncratic features. There are no one-size-

85

See Carmen. M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight
Centuries of Financial Crises (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 13882, 2008), available at
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/files/faculty/51_This_Time_Is_Different.pdf.
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fits-all prescriptions for crisis management policies. The Korean case has provided a good
example for this golden rule. IMF conditionality, which did not take into account the unique
nature of financial, corporate and social systems in Korea, inflicted unjustifiable harm to the
most vulnerable groups of people and businesses in Korea during the post-crisis reform period.
As evidenced in recent experiences of Korea’s responses to the current financial crisis,
Korea needs to establish an efficient management mechanism for the capital account, especially
short-term portfolio investment flows, and international reserve assets. Proper surveillance and
regulation of foreign banks in Korea are called for. The Korean word for “crisis”’ is “ui gi,”
combining the words for “danger” and “opportunity.” When we learn lessons from our past
experiences and mistakes, we will be able to convert a crisis of danger into the blessing of
opportunity.
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Table 1. Macroeconomic indicators of Korea, 1994-2008 86
1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

I. Domestic sector: Macro fundamentals
Real GDP growth rate, %
Gross fixed investment
growth rate, %
Inflation rate (CPI, %)
Unemployment rate, %
Governemnt budget
surplus/deficit, % of GDP
Government debt (tril.
Won), [% of GDP]
Interest rate, %
(call rate), year end
Stock price index, KOSPI
1980.1.4 = 100

7.9

8.6

6.4

4.8

-5.7

8.7

8.1

4.0

6.7

3.1

4.6

4.0

5.2

5.1

2.2

12.5

13.1

8.4

-2.3

-22.9

8.3

12.2

-0.2

6.6

4.0

2.1

2.4

3.6

4.0

-1.7

6.3
2.5

4.5
2.1

4.9
2.0

4.4
2.6

7.5
7.0

0.8
6.3

2.3
4.1

4.1
3.8

2.8
3.1

3.5
1.7

3.6
3.7

2.8
3.7

2.2
3.5

2.5
3.2

4.7
3.2

0.4

0.3

0.2

-1.4

-3.5

-2.3

1.0

1.1

3.1

1.0

0.6

0.4

0.4

3.2

1.3

60.3
[12.3]

80.4
[16.6]

93.6
[18.6]

111.4
[18.5]

122.1
[18.7]

133.6
[18.5]

165.7
[21.5]

203.1
[24.6]

248.0
[28.7]

282.8
[31.1]

298.9
[30.7]

308.3
[30.1]

14.1

11.1

12.5

21.3

7.0

4.8

5.3

4.7

4.2

3.8

3.6

3.3

4.2

4.8

3.3

965

935

833

655

406

807

734

573

757

680

833

1074

1352

1713

1533

II. External sector: Trade, capital flows, int’l reserves, external debt, exchange rates
Exports, $bil.
Imports, $bil.
Current a/c balance, $bil.
(% of GDP)
Capital and financial a/c
balance ($bil.)
a. FDI balance ($bil.)
b. Portfolio investment
balance ($bil.)
c. Borrowing by banks
($bil.)
International reserves,
$bil.
External debt, $bil
(% of GDP), [short-term
%]
Exchange rate (Won/$),
end of year
86

95
98
-4.0
(-1.0)

125
129
-8.7
(-1.7)

130
145
-23.1
(-4.1)

139
142
-8.3
(-1.6)

132
91
40.4
(11.7)

145
117
24.5
(5.5)

176
159
12.3
(2.4)

152
138
8.0
(1.7)

163
149
5.4
(1.0)

197
175
11.9
(2.0)

258
220
28.2
(4.1)

289
256
15.0
(1.9)

332
304
5.4
(0.6)

379
350
6.0
(0.6)

433
427

10.3

16.8

23.3

1.3

-3.2

2.0

12.1

-3.4

6.3

13.9

7.6

4.8

18.0

7.1

-50.9

-1.7

-1.8

-2.3

-1.6

0.7

5.1

4.3

1.1

-0.2

0.1

4.6

2.0

-4.5

-13.8

-10.6

6.1

11.6

15.2

14.3

-1.2

9.2

12.2

6.7

0.3

17.3

6.6

-3.5

-23.2

-26.1

-15.4

8

12

12

10

73

68

61

51

58

68

74

83

137

193

172

20

25

32

32

52

74

96

102

121

155

199

210

239

262

201

90
(21.2)
[53.4]

120
(23.2)
[57.8]

157
(28.2)
[58.3]

174
(33.7)
[57.6]

164
(47.3)
[24.2]

153
(34.4)
[28.2]

148
(28.9)
[33.5]

129
(26.7)
[31.3]

142
(25.9)
[34.1]

157
(25.9)
[32.3]

172
(25.3)
[32.7]

188
(23.7)
[35.1]

260
(29.3)
[43.7]

382
(39.4)
[41.8]

380
(40.9)
[39.7]

788

776

845

1695

1204

1138

1265

1314

1186

1193

1035

1012

930

936

1260

-6.4

Except where otherwise noted, these tables and figures are the author’s aggregation of statistics published in THE BANK OF KOREA, MONTHLY STATISTICAL
BULLETIN, various issues. This data is available at http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp.
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Table 2. Financial reform in Korea: Restructuring of financial insitutions, 1997-2006 87
Types of financial
institutions
Banks
NBFIs**
Merchant banks
(MBCs)
Securities co.
Insurance co.
Investment trust co
(ITCs)
Mutual savings
banks (MSBs)
Credit unions
Leasing companies

Total

Total no. of
institutions

Type of resolution
Others*
Subtotal
(B)

New entry

16

48.5

1

18

536

877

42.4

109

1,302

7

-

29

96.7

1

2

5

7

3

15

41.7

19

40

50

10

6

4

20

40.0

21

51

32

7

5

-

12

37.5

29

49

231

107

28

1

136

58.9

15

110

1,666

2

122

527

651

39.1

15

1,030

25

11

2

1

14

56.0

9

20

2,103

169

188

536

893

42.5

110

1,320

Merger

(as of Dec. 1997)

33

5

11

-

2070

164

177

30

22

36

Notes: * includes dissolution and asset transfers to bridge institutions. ** Non-bank financial institutions.

87

Total no. of
institutions

Ratio, %
(B/A)

License
revoked

PUB. FUNDS MGMT. COMM., MIN. OF FIN. AND ECON., WHITE PAPER ON PUBLIC FUNDS (2007).

(as of Oct. 2006)
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Table 3. Sources and uses of public funds in Korea, 1997-2006 88
(unit: trillion Korean won)
KAMCO*
Purchase of
NPLs

Recapitalization

Banks

24.6

34.0

13.9

NBFIs

11.8

29.5

1.3

Types of financial
institutions

Merchant banks
Insurance co
Securities co and
inv’t trust co
Mutual savings
banks
Credit union
Others
Total

KDIC** and others
Liquidity
Deposit insurinjection
ance payments

Purchase of
assets

Total

0.0

14.4

86.9

4.6

30.3

2.9

79.1

2.7

0.7

18.3

0.0

23.0

1.8

15.9

3.1

0.0

0.3

21.1

8.5

10.9

0.3

0.01

1.9

21.6

0.2

0.0

0.4

7.3

0.6

8.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

4.8

0.0

4.8

2.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

2.4

38.8

63.5

18.5

30.3

17.3

168.4

Notes: * The Korea Asset Management Corporation, ** The Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation

88

Id.
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Figure 1. Korea's real GDP growth rates (%), 1994-2008
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Figure 2. The saving-investment relations and the current account balance in Korea, 1980-2008
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Figure 2 (continued). The saving-investment relations and the current account balance in Korea, 1980-2008
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Figure 3. The impact of financial reform in Korea: Remove toxic assets and
improving BIS capital ratio

Notes: NPL ratio (the first bar) is the non-performing loan ratio for the entire financial industries (%), and
BIS ratio (the second bar) is the Bank of International Settlement capital standard ratio of risk-bearing
capital to the risk-weighted assets.
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Figure 4. The KAMCO’s activity: NPL purchases and NPL balances 89
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89

KAMCO, WHITE PAPER ON NON-PERFORMING LOANS RESOLUTION FUND 423 (2004).
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Figure 5. Injection and recovery of public funds in Korea, 1998-2006 90
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.

90

Joon-Kyung Kim, KDI, Public Funds and Post-Crisis Corporate and Financial Restructuring in Korea, presented at the International Forum on NonPerforming Asset Funds, April 2007.
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Figure 6. Share of Foreign Ownership in Stock Market, Bond Market,
and the Banking Sector in Korea* 91

Notes: * the market share of foreign banks in Korea using the bank asset base.

91

Data from Joon-Kyung Kim & Chung H. Lee, The Political Economy of Government, Financial System, and the Chaebols Before and After the 1997 Financial
Crisis
in
Korea
(Center
for
Contemporary
Asian
Studies
Working
Paper
No.
11,
2008),
available
at
http://www1.doshisha.ac.jp/~ccas/eng/Epublications/eWP11lee.pdf; and Ji Wu et al., supra note 70.
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Figure 7. Korea’s net portfolio investment balance, 1994-2008
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Figure 8. Korea’s external debt: Total amount ($billion) and short-term debt (% of total)
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